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PROVIDING EVIDENCE OF A MULTIPLE-PROCESS MODEL OF TRUST IN 
AUTOMATION 
 
Stephen Rice 
Gayle Hunt 
New Mexico State University 
Las Cruces, New Mexico 
 
This study focuses on the effects of human responses to computer automation aids. Previous 
research has shown that different types of automation errors (false alarms and misses) affect 
human trust in different ways. False alarms tend to negatively affect operator compliance, whereas 
misses tend to negatively affect operator reliance. Participants were asked to determine whether an 
enemy target was present or absent in a series of images, a task similar to what a UAV operator 
might be asked to perform. A diagnostic aid provided recommendations before participants 
viewed each image. Reliability and type of automation error were manipulated in order to provide 
data to determine which of four theoretical models is most accurate. Analyses provided conclusive 
evidence that a multiple-process theory of operator trust is the only model which accurately 
explains behavior outcomes in this type of situation. A discussion of theoretical and practical 
implications of this finding is included. 
 
The use of automation has accelerated so rapidly that it has outpaced the formation of a comprehensive 
theoretical understanding of human interaction with automated systems. Specifically, it is alarming to take notice of 
the lack of theory explaining how errors in automation affect human trust in this technology, which has an impact on 
the level of human dependence on automated systems. Although it is possible to find theoretical literature on this 
topic (e.g. Meyer, 2001; 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), it is nonetheless limited and must be studied more 
extensively in order to achieve a full understanding of the human cognitive process during human-automation 
interaction. Both trust (a cognitive state) and dependence (a behavior) are key factors in these studies, although they 
are not always correlated.  
Many researchers have studied the cognitive and perceptual benefits of the use of automation on multi-tasking. 
In particular, it is presumed that when automation can be held responsible for completing a task, this should free up 
cognitive resources for the operator to focus on a different task at hand. The number of simultaneous tasks 
performed should equal the number of automated tasks plus the task being performed by the operator (e.g. Dixon, 
Wickens, & Chang, 2005). 
Recently, there has been some attention on research focused on transferring cognitive resources away from an 
automated system and toward another task. An example of this research might be visual search and supervisory 
control. Many times, these two tasks are performed together (e.g. Dixon & Wickens, 2006). A real world example of 
this would be when a UAV operator must monitor all controls while simultaneously searching images for enemy 
targets (e.g. Maltz & Shinar, 2003).  
While presently there are multiple people employed to operate a single UAV, there is an eventual goal to assign 
only one operator to each UAV, making it essential to understand the cognitive process of performing multiple tasks 
as well as working with, trusting, and depending on automation to lighten the load. It is also crucial to study 
automated systems that are not perfectly reliable and discover their implications on operator trust and performance 
of human-automation teams. 
It is thought that automation takes place over four stages that are somewhat related to stages of human 
information processing (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000). The first stage is information synthesis, which 
occurs by directing focus to particularly important environmental factors. The second stage is diagnosis, when 
automation provides an assumption about the information that has been taken in. Some examples may include 
warning alarms, which serve to focus the operator’s attention on important events by utilizing auditory and/or visual 
warnings. The third stage is selection of response, and the fourth stage is execution of that selection. This paper will 
focus primarily on automation diagnosis, the second stage. 
When stage 2 diagnosis is being utilized, it is possible that the operator may not have access to the information 
that is being processed. Instead the operator may only have access to the information provided by the automation. In 
the situation where an operator has raw data to confirm or disconfirm automation warnings, the performance 
outcome may be very different than when an operator has no raw data and must choose whether or not to follow the 
automation blindly (Sorkin & Woods, 1985). Further, human dependence on automation systems may be much more 
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fickle when there is no raw data to allow the operator to confirm the diagnosis, which may cause a grave failure. 
This study will focus only on diagnostic automation with raw data readily available to the operator. 
Although reliable automation warnings can greatly increase positive performance (e.g. Dixon, Wickens & 
Chang, 2005; Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Dixon, Wickens & McCarley, 2007), diagnostic automation is seldom 
perfect. Most often, the information being processed by the automation is imperfect, or the automation must make 
an assumption about an event that has yet to occur. Because diagnostic automation is often flawed, it is critical to 
understand how this factor affects the operator’s trust and dependence on the system. 
Signal detection theory is a useful tool in the understanding of automation errors. According to this theory, there 
are four possible outcomes of a diagnostic automation: hits (correct warning), misses (incorrect non-warning), false 
alarms (incorrect warning), or correct rejections (correct non-warning). Among these four possibilities, two of them 
(misses and false alarms) are automation errors. It may seem like a simple assumption that these errors are equally 
harmful and produce consequences of equal severity, but research has indicated differently. Data supports the idea 
that false alarms may be more harmful than misses (e.g. Bliss, 2003), and that the two error types actually cause 
very different consequences, especially in relation to operator trust (e.g. Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Maltz & Shinar, 
2003; Meyer, 2001; 2004; Wickens & Dixon, 2007). 
One method of discriminating between false alarms and misses has been offered by Meyer (2001; 2004). 
According to Meyer, false alarms have a negative effect on compliance, whereas misses have a negative effect on 
reliance. Compliance refers to how the operator responds to a warning, and reliance is how the operator responds to 
no warning. It can be inferred that this is an indication of each type of error affecting single but separate cognitive 
processes, as seen in Figure 1b. While this may seem reasonable, there has been much data indicating that false 
alarms affect both operator reliance and compliance (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Dixon, Wickens & McCarley, 2007; 
Wickens, Dixon, Goh, & Hammer, 2005). 
Some of the strongest evidence to date suggests that false alarms have just as much of a negative effect on 
reliance as do misses (Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007). This data is conceptualized in Figure 1c. 
Finally, further evidence supports yet another model. Rice and McCarley (2008) found that not only do false 
alarms have an effect on both compliance and reliance, but the same is the case for misses. It was found that misses 
have a negative effect on both areas as well. This evidence may be conceptualized in two ways, as demonstrated in 
Figures 1a and 1d. 
 
 
Figure 1. A) Single-process model; B) A selective two-process model; C) Mandler’s two-process model; D) non-selective two-process model. 
Adapted from Dunn & Kirsner (1988). 
 
With so many different models attempting to explain how errors in automation affect the behaviors of operators, 
there must be a way to distinguish between them and determine which best fits the data. One solution to this 
problem is to perform a state trace analysis on the data (Bamber, 1979; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988). 
A state trace analysis plots two dependent variables against each other. The goal of this comparison is to 
observe if a monotonic relationship exists within the data. If a monotonic relationship is revealed, any change to one 
dependent variable will have a similar effect on the other. Should this be the case, a single process model, such as 
that in Figure 1b, would be supported. However, if the data demonstrates a non-monotonic relationship, (or a 
reversed association; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988), this would support a multiple process model, which indicates that at 
least two cognitive processes are in play (Bamber, 1979). 
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In order to simulate a task common to UAV operators, participants were asked to perform a target detection task 
by searching a set of aerial images of Baghdad for the presence or absence of an enemy tank. Assistance in this task 
was provided to participants in the form of a diagnostic aid which ranged in reliability from 95 to 55 percent in 5% 
increments. The automation was set to produce either false alarms or misses. This yielded 18 conditions total; 9 for 
false alarms and 9 for misses. Participants were fully informed of the type of errors the automation would make, as 
well as the reliability of the automation, and they were given clear feedback following each response. 
There were four hypotheses related to this study: 1) better overall performance would occur in conditions with 
higher automation reliability as compared with lower automation reliability; 2) false alarm conditions would have 
strong selective effects on compliance and weaker non-selective effects on reliance, which would affect both how 
often the participant agrees with the automation and how quickly this decision is made; 3) miss conditions would 
have strong selective effects on reliance and weaker non-selective effects on compliance, again affecting both the 
rates of agreement and the response time; and 4) the use of a state trace analysis would uncover a non-monotonic 
relationship between compliance and reliance measures, supporting a multiple process theory to explain the 
outcome. 
 
Method 
 
Participants included 380 undergraduate students from New Mexico State University (230 females, 150 males), 
with a mean age of 20.3, who were compensated with partial course credit for their participation. All participants 
were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal eye sight as well as for color vision. 
Images were presented on a 1024 x 768 resolution 20 inch flat-screen Dell monitor and computer with a refresh 
rate of 60 Hz. The monitor was roughly 40 degrees by 40 degrees in visual angle. One hundred images were 
presented to each participant, half of which consisted of target-absent stimuli and half of target-present stimuli. The 
target-absent stimuli were made up of 50 unchanged aerial images of Baghdad. The target-present stimuli were 
made up of the same 50 target-absent images, but with a tank digitally inserted into the image. The visual angle of 
the tank was roughly 2 degrees by 2 degrees, displayed with the turret facing one of 8 randomly assigned directions, 
N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, or NW. The presentation of images was randomized. 
Participants were seated in a chair with their heads positioned by a chin rest 20 inches from the computer 
monitor. Each participant signed a consent form and proceeded to read directions presented on the screen. Directions 
included a sample picture of the target tank as well as full information regarding the type of error and reliability of 
the automation. Participants were asked to proceed quickly and with as much accuracy as possible. When 
participants felt confident with their instructions, they began the experiment. 
As per the instructions, participants were aided by an aid which presented a recommendation before each image 
appeared on the screen. Twenty participants were randomly assigned to each of the 18 conditions. 
Each trial was preceded by a small fixation, displayed for 1000 ms. Next was a screen providing the automation 
recommendation for the upcoming image, displayed for 1500 ms. The screen was then replaced with a randomly 
selected image from the previously mentioned set of 100 images. The image remained on the screen until the 
participant made a decision indicated by pressing the F or J key about the absence or presence of a tank 
(respectively). Following this, participants were presented with a feedback screen, displaying their accuracy and 
response time for that decision, as well as their cumulative accuracy for all the images they were previously 
presented with. 
 
Results 
 
General analyses (d’, C, and RT) are offered first, subsequently followed by additional analyses regarding 
compliance and reliance concerns. Finally, a state trace analysis was performed so as to test the theoretical models 
represented in Figure 1. 
Sensitivity refers to a participant’s ability to differentiate target-present from target-absent images, quantified by 
using the signal detection measure of sensitivity, d’. A two-way ANOVA on the imperfectly reliable conditions with 
Automation Error Type and Reliability as factors indicated that performance increased as the reliability of the 
automation increased, F(8, 342) = 14.65, p < .001, but showed no reliable effect of Automation Error Type, F(1, 
342) = 1.23, p > .05, nor a reliable interaction of Automation Error Type and Reliability, F < 1.0, p > .05. These 
findings denote that although increased reliability rates did improve overall accuracy, automation error type did not 
affect accuracy. 
Participants’ response bias was calculated using the signal detection measure C. A two-way ANOVA on the 
imperfectly reliable conditions with Automation Error Type and Reliability indicated that participants in the False 
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Alarm conditions (M = -0.06), had a more liberal response bias than they did in the Miss conditions (M = 0.23), F(1, 
342) = 58.12, p < .001; that is, participants were more apt to indicate that the target was present, regardless of their 
true performance sensitivity. There was no significant main effect of Reliability on participants’ response bias, 
although it was marginally significant, F(8, 342) = 1.87, p = .063. An interaction between Automation Error Type 
and Reliability, F(8, 342) = 2.77, p < .01, indicated that the False Alarm condition was more likely to generate a 
liberal response bias among participants as the automation reliability increased. 
Agreement rates and RTs were measured with the assumption that when participants trusted the automation, 
they would respond quickly in agreement. Only RTs from correct trials were integrated into the data analysis. 
Compliance rate refers to the frequency in which participants agreed with the automation when it reported that a 
target was present. A two-way ANOVA performed on the imperfectly reliable conditions, with Automation Error 
Type and Reliability as factors, revealed a main effect of Automation Error Type, F(1, 342) = 38.81, p < .001, and a 
main effect of Reliability, F(8, 342) = 4.87, p < .001, with a significant interaction, F(2, 66) = 2.15, p < .05. These 
results indicate that participants in the False Alarm conditions were less likely than those in the Miss conditions to 
agree with the automation when it reported that a target was present, particularly when the automation was less 
reliable.  
Reliance rate refers to the frequency in which participants agreed with the automation when it reported that the 
target was not present. A two-way ANOVA performed on the imperfectly reliable conditions, with Automation 
Error Type and Reliability as factors, revealed a main effect of Automation Error Type, F(1, 342) = 25.64, p < .001, 
but no main effect of Reliability, F(8, 342) = 1.87, p > .05, and no interaction, F(2, 66) = 1.14, p > .05. The 
significant main effect of Error Type indicates that participants in the Miss conditions were less likely than those in 
the False Alarm conditions to agree with the automation when it reported that a target was not present. 
Compliance response time refers to the speed in which participants agreed with the automation when it reported 
that a target was present. A two-way ANOVA performed on the imperfectly reliable conditions, with Automation 
Error Type and Reliability as factors, revealed a main effect of Automation Error Type, F(1, 342) = 48.15, p < .001, 
no main effect of Reliability, F(8, 342) = 1.37, p > .05, and no significant interaction between Automation Error 
Type and Reliability, F(2, 66) = 1.48, p > .05. These results indicate that participants in the False Alarm conditions 
were slower to agree with the automation when it reported that a target was present, as compared to those in the 
Miss conditions.  
Reliance response time refers to the speed in which participants agreed with the automation when it reported 
that a target was not present. A two-way ANOVA performed on the imperfectly reliable conditions, with 
Automation Error Type and Reliability as factors, revealed a main effect of Automation Error Type, F(1, 342) = 
33.70, p < .001, with no main effect of Reliability, F(8, 342) = 1.57, p > .05, and no significant interaction between 
Automation Error Type and Reliability, F(2, 66) < 1.0, p > .05. These results indicate that participants in the Miss 
conditions were slower to agree with the automation when it determined that a target was not present, as compared 
to those in the False Alarm conditions.  
The data above expose a pattern of false alarm rates affecting participant compliance more so than reliance, 
whereas miss rates affected participant reliance more so than compliance. However, in regards to the theoretical 
models discussed in the Introduction, this behavioral data cannot conclusively determine which model is correct. In 
order to test these issues, state trace analyses were performed on agreement rates and RTs, as seen in Figure 2a and 
2b. 
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Figure 2. State Trace Analyses on a) Agreement Rates (%); and b) RTs (sec).  
 
This analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between the dependent variables. Spearman rank order 
correlations on the data revealed an r = -0.28 for Compliance agreement rates against Reliance agreement rates, and 
r = -0.35 for Compliance RT against Reliance RT. This information conclusively supports the notion that false 
alarm-prone and miss-prone automation affect at least two different cognitive processes, which translates to a 
different effect on operator behavior. 
 
Discussion 
 
All four theoretical models described in the introduction assume that there are only two types of automation 
errors (miss and false alarm) and two types of responses to these errors (compliance and reliance). 
Recall the argument by Meyer (2001; 2004) presented in the introduction (Figure 1b). The data in this current 
study conclusively disconfirm the extreme version of this theory (Note: we agree that Meyer never actually 
advocated an extreme version). Analyses clearly show that false alarm rates affect both compliance and reliance. 
Furthermore, the theoretical model in Figure 1c has also been disconfirmed, as miss rates also affected both 
compliance and reliance. 
With the models in Figures 1b and 1c no longer viable, we are left with the task of determining the correct 
model between Figures 1a and 1d. The only way to distinguish between these two models is with the use of a state 
trace analysis. As explained in the introduction, a monotonic relationship provides support for a single-process 
model, while a non-monotonic relationship proves a multiple-process model. 
A very clear non-monotonic relationship emerged from the data. In short, an increase in value for one did not 
result in an equal increase for the other. Clearly, there are at least two separate cognitive processes involved in 
responding to automation false alarms and automation misses. This finding now disconfirms the theoretical model 
displayed in Figure 1a and clearly confirms the model in Figure 1d. 
As predicted, higher automation reliability yielded better human-automation performance overall, when 
compared to less reliable automation. This effect is consistent with previous research (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; 
Dixon, Wickens & McCarley, 2007). Thus, highly reliable automation should be used whenever possible, as it may 
be argued that reduced reliability rates could possibly do more harm than good (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). 
Designers must take care when establishing the bias (more false alarms vs. more misses) of automation systems. 
They must not falsely assume that either type of error will produce the same effect. While the current data indicate 
that overall human-automation performance is not differentially affected by the automation bias, it is clear that 
performance during target-present or target-absent trials is differentially affected. The discrepancy between 
degradation of compliance (associated more strongly with false alarms) and degradation of reliance (associated more 
strongly with misses) must be carefully considered when programming the bias of an automated system. 
Designers must consider which type of human error is more devastating—missing a target or falsely reporting a 
target. In a situation like airport security screening, it is much more dangerous to miss a target object than it is to 
falsely detect a target object. On the other hand, regarding an event such as a fire alarm, it is much more dangerous 
to have constant false alarms, as people may become subject to the “cry-wolf” effect (Breznitz, 1983). In situations 
like these, designers must adjust the automation bias according to the least harmful potential outcome. 
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